Washington Draws a Line in the Sand on Settlements -- With Palestine
By Ian Williams, February 18, 2011 FPIF
It’s tough being a naked superpower when the caterpillars munch away your fig leaf.
In real terms it makes Chamberlain at Munich look like a stickler for principle. The President and Secretary of State of the United States have been pleading and pressuring over Israeli settlements, which Washington opposes.
But who are they pleading with? Who are they cajoling and pressuring? Not the Israeli president building the settlements, but President Mahmoud Abbas of Palestine, to withdraw the Security Council resolution which expresses the sentiment of the entire world -- including the US -- that the settlements are illegal. In real terms it makes Chamberlain at Munich look like a stickler for principle.
To head off this disastrous dilemma heading to impale its Middle Eastern policy, the US had drafted an ineffectual and in any case non-binding statement that admitted to the “illegitimacy” of settlements in the West Bank, but spent more space condemning ineffectual rocket attacks from Gaza.
But Abbas had no option but to go ahead and put the resolution to the vote. It won 14 to one, with US Ambassador Susan Rice casting a veto.
The administration was scared that it would either be forced to support its own policy in the Security Council and thus risk an excreta tempest from AIPAC -- or that it would veto a resolution that it agrees with and humiliate itself in front of the rest of world, including its real allies in NATO.
“We reject in the strongest terms possible the legitimacy of the continued settlement building,” inveighed Rice, while ferociously condemning them as “folly,” bad for Israel as well. However that just reinforced the international message that the Israeli tail was wagging the American dog to vote against its own policy.
A positive vote would have sent a serious signal to Netanyahu not to trifle with his only protector and major paymaster. However, all Netanyahu has had to do is to refer to the even more crazed ideologues who surround him, who will not hear of “concessions” on settlements. But poor Abbas, beleaguered by WikiLeaks showing him trying to kill the Goldstone Report under US pressure and showing what most Palestinians regard as an overflexible, indeed supine, negotiating posture in the peace talks, is assumed not to have a domestic constituency he has to care for.
One would have thought that after Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain, this administration would have picked up some hints about diplomacy, not least that diktats and dollars to proxy dictators does not make for stable relationships. But the world’s rapidly attenuating super power was reduced to covering for a coalition of deranged rabbis, likudnik-inclined millionaires, Neocons and evangelical Christian Zionists in the UN Security Council.
It did so in front of a Security Council packed with most of the General Assembly members who have expressed their negative views on settlement over and over again to vote on a resolution sponsored by a wide geographical and ideological range of states -- including many EU and NATO members. The resolution was moved by Lebanon, whose ambassador eschewed inflammatory rhetoric and merely cited successive Security Council resolutions, World Court opinions and Geneva Conventions on the issue not to mention Israel’s own commitments under the Quartet’s “Road Map.”
Tip O’Neill’s dictum “All politics is local” is not always true. For a start, polls show that most American Jews oppose Netanyahu and his settlement policy. But more cogently, the masses of Arab citizens on the streets of their rapidly reforming countries bitterly oppose the settlements, and will draw their own conclusions from the Obama policy.
To stop AIPAC huffing and puffing, the Obama administration is about to lose Egypt, Tunisia and much of the rest of the Middle East and erase the last faint hopes of the region that the US can in any way give genuine support to democracy or international law. The disillusionment is going to be all the more profound because of the betrayal of the spirit of Obama’s early speeches in Istanbul and Cairo. Instead of sending serious signal to Netanyahu not to trifle with your only protector, he is now confirmed in his obduracy. And Arabs and other world citizens are even more convinced of US duplicity.
Obama also has yet another crisis coming. The UK, on behalf of France and Germany as well, promised to do all it could to welcome Palestine as a UN member by this September, thereby pushing yet another hot button for AIPAC -- and thus the administration.
Showing posts with label Israel Palestine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Israel Palestine. Show all posts
Friday, February 18, 2011
Tuesday, October 26, 2010
Harper @ Gates of UN
Canada on Ice: at the UN
By Ian Williams, October 26, 2010
Canada’s defeat in elections for a temporary seat in the UN Security Council has implications that reach beyond being an upset for Stephen Harper’s conservative government in Ottawa. It reinforces how far most UN members are from supporting other nations that unconditionally accept Israeli behavior in the Middle East. It also, ironically, lends some support to Ottawa’s longstanding opposition to increasing the number of permanent Security Council members.
In a secret ballot election in early October, UN General Assembly members cast votes for which nations would fill the non-permanent seats on the Security Council for the next two years. While the Asian, African, and Latin American seats were uncontested, the two seats for the Western European and Other group (which includes Canada) were up for grabs. Germany won the ballot outright. In the second round, Canada lost to Portugal, 78 to 113. This rout should have been a wakeup call for the Canadian electorate. Sadly, it is unlikely to disturb the isolationist reveries of Stephen Harper and his right-wing Canadian government.
Indeed, some Canadian diplomats quietly suggest that Harper and company scarcely noticed the Security Council candidacy was coming up for a vote until the last moment. They then did little or nothing to prepare for it and seemed insouciant of how conservative policies had tarnished the country’s once golden reputation. This reflects the isolationism of the party’s domestic base.
The defeat has implications extending beyond Canadian discomfort. Discussions have been underway for reforming the Security Council, including increasing the number of permanent and non-permanent members. In January, five of the countries aspiring to these new permanent seats will be sitting as elected members. Germany, India, and South Africa were elected this year to join already sitting Brazil and Nigeria among the putative permanent members. Canada, which opposes adding new permanent seats, will not be at the table even in a temporary capacity.
Losing Status
Although the rather arrogant Harper government did not expect this outcome, more objective observers inside and outside of Canada were not surprised. It was only one more sign that the shelf life was expiring on the prestige accumulated by previous governments.
Since the beginning of the UN, Canada has been up there with Sweden as the very model of a modern UN member and has been almost automatically elected to any position in the organization. This is not just because Canadians were polite or that the Mounties had nice red uniforms. It was based on an independence of spirit that could happily defy London and, more importantly, Washington on issues of principle and international law. With the traditional social-democratic and liberal attitudes of much of the Canadian electorate, Harper’s government has not been able to live up to its conservative aspirations at home. But since the executive branch has more unbridled influence over foreign policy, it has been able to overturn longstanding international attitudes.
In times past, Ottawa had defied its giant neighbor to establish relations with China and later maintained trade, travel and diplomatic links with Cuba. Before the Harper administration, Canada supported important pillars of international law, such as the international tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court. It pioneered the articulation of the Responsibility to Protect, which established principles for genuine humanitarian intervention that avoided acting as a cover for aggression. It also led such important campaigns as the ban on land mines.
Then Stephen Harper and the new breed of rebarbative and reactionary Canadian conservatives took over. They began by emulating President George W. Bush at almost every level, and in some ways went further. Canada showed hostility to Russia and China, more on atavistic Cold War grounds than because of any deep concern for human rights, since Ottawa developed a U.S.-style expediency on that subject. Its troops in Afghanistan handed over prisoners to the CIA. Its officials did nothing at all about Canadian citizens that the United States kidnapped in New York and sent for torture in the Middle East or held in Guantanamo.
Harper’s Canada reversed 60 years of Canadian practice. The country that almost invented peacekeeping stopped contributing blue helmets to peacekeeping forces. The inherent isolationism of many conservatives was also reflected in the retrenchment of foreign missions and foreign aid.
Changes in Middle East Policy
Canada’s pre-Harper policies on the Middle East conflict, reflected on the official foreign ministry website, had been exemplary statements of international law and accepted UN decisions. As such, Canada refused to recognize the annexation of the territories, declared settlements to be illegal, and called for an independent Palestinian state.
Although the website has not changed, executive decisions have profoundly changed the interpretation of these policies. The government has withdrawn contributions to UNRWA, which feeds and educates Palestinian refugees. It defunded grants to NGOs that investigate Israeli human rights abuses as well as Arab Israeli human rights research. And whatever you think of the principle, what government with any sense of diplomacy signs a trade agreement with Israel days before asking for nonaligned votes?
There could be an expedient argument for kowtowing to a neighboring superpower, but Ottawa does not seem to have noticed the last election in the United States. In fairness to Canadian independence, Harper’s government was not so much emulating Bush as pandering to deep-rooted domestic conservatism and accommodating its own right-wing Israel lobby in the hope that traditionally Liberal constituencies with a large Jewish vote would switch to Harper’s Conservatives.
That at least partially explains why Harper continues to pander to Bushism even now Bush has gone. Harper’s about-face puts Ottawa out of step with Washington, at a time when the Obama administration has taken steps to reach out to Arab and Muslim countries despite denouncements by right-wing hawks that the United States is turning anti-Israel. Dragged to the right by the unforgiving Likud-inclined lobby, the Canadian government now acts as if Israel can do no wrong. In contrast with the usual abstentions of the EU when Israel is on the agenda, Canada has recently opposed any scrutiny of Israeli actions. For instance, it voted against the UN Human Rights Council even considering Operation Cast Lead.
Some in Canada’s Conservative government blamed Michael Ignatieff, the leader of the opposition, for the Security Council defeat, Earlier this fall, Ignatieff had questioned whether his nation should earn a seat given its failure to pay attention to the UN and its current foreign policy. Indeed, there is little opposition even from the Canadian opposition to the proposition that Israel is always right.
UN Reform Stalled
Ironically, the defeat of Canada vindicates a longstanding Canadian proposition that no additional permanent Security Council seats should be created. Rather, Canada has supported the creation of more elected seats with the option for renewable terms. Ironically, this eminently sensible proposal might also have cost Ottawa some support from would be permanent seat holders. In any case, maybe Ottawa’s defeat this time will send a message to other aspiring powers about the need to listen to their international colleagues.
Since the existing permanent five can veto any attempt to take away their veto - and frankly the United States, Russia, and China would probably quit the organization without it - the proposal does not compound the injustice by creating new permanent seats, let alone new permanent seats with vetoes. Rather, it ensures that Brazil, Egypt, Germany, India, Japan, Nigeria, or South Africa would have to truly reflect the views of their regions and the UN community to be re-elected.
In a way, the line-up of newly elected members is almost a dry run for such a Council. The United States and the rest of the Permanent Five will not likely be able to ignore non-permanent members who have serious power in the real world rather than simply power by virtue of their position in the Council.
Smaller members have also played significant roles when seated in the Council; Ireland, Jamaica, Mauritius, and others provided more consistent and less expedient opposition to the Iraq War than France. But a Security Council composed of seriously sized emerging powers, representing smaller members in their regions, could shift the global center of gravity away from the “G-Forces” the G8 and G20.
Canada’s defeat is a salutary lesson for nations -– and their leaders -- who ignore world opinion. Ignatieff’s fact-based assertion that the country simply did not deserve a Security Council seat under the Harper government demonstrates that the opposition is more in touch with the international order than the government.
The traditional pro-UN Canadian position can draw some comfort from the Canadian defeat, which points the way for genuine Security Council reform – ensuring that its members represent the world in ways more profound than bean-counting regional representation. No member of the Council should have impunity for their geopolitical behavior – as perhaps the Obama administration will soon discover when the UN tries to reconcile unilateral Palestinian declarations of statehood with unilateral and illegal settlement-building.
Ian Williams, senior analyst and long time contributor to FPIF, is a New York-based author and journalist. He is currently working on a new edition of his book, The UN For Beginners.
.
Recommended Citation:
Ian Williams, "Canada on Ice: at the UN" (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, October 26, 2010)
By Ian Williams, October 26, 2010
Canada’s defeat in elections for a temporary seat in the UN Security Council has implications that reach beyond being an upset for Stephen Harper’s conservative government in Ottawa. It reinforces how far most UN members are from supporting other nations that unconditionally accept Israeli behavior in the Middle East. It also, ironically, lends some support to Ottawa’s longstanding opposition to increasing the number of permanent Security Council members.
In a secret ballot election in early October, UN General Assembly members cast votes for which nations would fill the non-permanent seats on the Security Council for the next two years. While the Asian, African, and Latin American seats were uncontested, the two seats for the Western European and Other group (which includes Canada) were up for grabs. Germany won the ballot outright. In the second round, Canada lost to Portugal, 78 to 113. This rout should have been a wakeup call for the Canadian electorate. Sadly, it is unlikely to disturb the isolationist reveries of Stephen Harper and his right-wing Canadian government.
Indeed, some Canadian diplomats quietly suggest that Harper and company scarcely noticed the Security Council candidacy was coming up for a vote until the last moment. They then did little or nothing to prepare for it and seemed insouciant of how conservative policies had tarnished the country’s once golden reputation. This reflects the isolationism of the party’s domestic base.
The defeat has implications extending beyond Canadian discomfort. Discussions have been underway for reforming the Security Council, including increasing the number of permanent and non-permanent members. In January, five of the countries aspiring to these new permanent seats will be sitting as elected members. Germany, India, and South Africa were elected this year to join already sitting Brazil and Nigeria among the putative permanent members. Canada, which opposes adding new permanent seats, will not be at the table even in a temporary capacity.
Losing Status
Although the rather arrogant Harper government did not expect this outcome, more objective observers inside and outside of Canada were not surprised. It was only one more sign that the shelf life was expiring on the prestige accumulated by previous governments.
Since the beginning of the UN, Canada has been up there with Sweden as the very model of a modern UN member and has been almost automatically elected to any position in the organization. This is not just because Canadians were polite or that the Mounties had nice red uniforms. It was based on an independence of spirit that could happily defy London and, more importantly, Washington on issues of principle and international law. With the traditional social-democratic and liberal attitudes of much of the Canadian electorate, Harper’s government has not been able to live up to its conservative aspirations at home. But since the executive branch has more unbridled influence over foreign policy, it has been able to overturn longstanding international attitudes.
In times past, Ottawa had defied its giant neighbor to establish relations with China and later maintained trade, travel and diplomatic links with Cuba. Before the Harper administration, Canada supported important pillars of international law, such as the international tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court. It pioneered the articulation of the Responsibility to Protect, which established principles for genuine humanitarian intervention that avoided acting as a cover for aggression. It also led such important campaigns as the ban on land mines.
Then Stephen Harper and the new breed of rebarbative and reactionary Canadian conservatives took over. They began by emulating President George W. Bush at almost every level, and in some ways went further. Canada showed hostility to Russia and China, more on atavistic Cold War grounds than because of any deep concern for human rights, since Ottawa developed a U.S.-style expediency on that subject. Its troops in Afghanistan handed over prisoners to the CIA. Its officials did nothing at all about Canadian citizens that the United States kidnapped in New York and sent for torture in the Middle East or held in Guantanamo.
Harper’s Canada reversed 60 years of Canadian practice. The country that almost invented peacekeeping stopped contributing blue helmets to peacekeeping forces. The inherent isolationism of many conservatives was also reflected in the retrenchment of foreign missions and foreign aid.
Changes in Middle East Policy
Canada’s pre-Harper policies on the Middle East conflict, reflected on the official foreign ministry website, had been exemplary statements of international law and accepted UN decisions. As such, Canada refused to recognize the annexation of the territories, declared settlements to be illegal, and called for an independent Palestinian state.
Although the website has not changed, executive decisions have profoundly changed the interpretation of these policies. The government has withdrawn contributions to UNRWA, which feeds and educates Palestinian refugees. It defunded grants to NGOs that investigate Israeli human rights abuses as well as Arab Israeli human rights research. And whatever you think of the principle, what government with any sense of diplomacy signs a trade agreement with Israel days before asking for nonaligned votes?
There could be an expedient argument for kowtowing to a neighboring superpower, but Ottawa does not seem to have noticed the last election in the United States. In fairness to Canadian independence, Harper’s government was not so much emulating Bush as pandering to deep-rooted domestic conservatism and accommodating its own right-wing Israel lobby in the hope that traditionally Liberal constituencies with a large Jewish vote would switch to Harper’s Conservatives.
That at least partially explains why Harper continues to pander to Bushism even now Bush has gone. Harper’s about-face puts Ottawa out of step with Washington, at a time when the Obama administration has taken steps to reach out to Arab and Muslim countries despite denouncements by right-wing hawks that the United States is turning anti-Israel. Dragged to the right by the unforgiving Likud-inclined lobby, the Canadian government now acts as if Israel can do no wrong. In contrast with the usual abstentions of the EU when Israel is on the agenda, Canada has recently opposed any scrutiny of Israeli actions. For instance, it voted against the UN Human Rights Council even considering Operation Cast Lead.
Some in Canada’s Conservative government blamed Michael Ignatieff, the leader of the opposition, for the Security Council defeat, Earlier this fall, Ignatieff had questioned whether his nation should earn a seat given its failure to pay attention to the UN and its current foreign policy. Indeed, there is little opposition even from the Canadian opposition to the proposition that Israel is always right.
UN Reform Stalled
Ironically, the defeat of Canada vindicates a longstanding Canadian proposition that no additional permanent Security Council seats should be created. Rather, Canada has supported the creation of more elected seats with the option for renewable terms. Ironically, this eminently sensible proposal might also have cost Ottawa some support from would be permanent seat holders. In any case, maybe Ottawa’s defeat this time will send a message to other aspiring powers about the need to listen to their international colleagues.
Since the existing permanent five can veto any attempt to take away their veto - and frankly the United States, Russia, and China would probably quit the organization without it - the proposal does not compound the injustice by creating new permanent seats, let alone new permanent seats with vetoes. Rather, it ensures that Brazil, Egypt, Germany, India, Japan, Nigeria, or South Africa would have to truly reflect the views of their regions and the UN community to be re-elected.
In a way, the line-up of newly elected members is almost a dry run for such a Council. The United States and the rest of the Permanent Five will not likely be able to ignore non-permanent members who have serious power in the real world rather than simply power by virtue of their position in the Council.
Smaller members have also played significant roles when seated in the Council; Ireland, Jamaica, Mauritius, and others provided more consistent and less expedient opposition to the Iraq War than France. But a Security Council composed of seriously sized emerging powers, representing smaller members in their regions, could shift the global center of gravity away from the “G-Forces” the G8 and G20.
Canada’s defeat is a salutary lesson for nations -– and their leaders -- who ignore world opinion. Ignatieff’s fact-based assertion that the country simply did not deserve a Security Council seat under the Harper government demonstrates that the opposition is more in touch with the international order than the government.
The traditional pro-UN Canadian position can draw some comfort from the Canadian defeat, which points the way for genuine Security Council reform – ensuring that its members represent the world in ways more profound than bean-counting regional representation. No member of the Council should have impunity for their geopolitical behavior – as perhaps the Obama administration will soon discover when the UN tries to reconcile unilateral Palestinian declarations of statehood with unilateral and illegal settlement-building.
Ian Williams, senior analyst and long time contributor to FPIF, is a New York-based author and journalist. He is currently working on a new edition of his book, The UN For Beginners.
.
Recommended Citation:
Ian Williams, "Canada on Ice: at the UN" (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, October 26, 2010)
Monday, June 08, 2009
Width and quality of Barack Obama’s peace commitments
Ian Williams: Tribune
June 8, 2009 12:00
Reversing Bill Clinton’s election dictum, Barack Obama shows an admirable attention span. “It’s not just the economy, stupid.” No one can accuse him of neglecting the economy, but one of the lessons being reinforced is that he needs to pull the political process with him. This is particularly important when the Democratic Party in Congress has a vociferous and disloyal group of rightists who will vote with the Republicans at the drop of a hat in the name of moderation.
That is one of the explanations for Obama’s incremental strategy on the Middle East. Faced with the most obtuse and self-centred set of Israeli leaders, he has to cover his rear carefully and so far the Likud-led coalition of zealots is playing into his hands.
Readers of a certain age may remember David Kossof on television playing a Jewish tailor whose watchword was “Never mind the quality – feel the width.” He seems to have written the script for recent Israeli diplomacy, which has been predicated on talking to politicians who truly and sincerely want the wool pulled over their eyes.
Things have changed. Binyamin Netanyahu came to see Obama and wanted a quick deadline for an attack on Iran. Despite his crowing, he got a promise of open-ended negotiations with Tehran and a warning that the Americans thought that settlement building was a more urgent problem. He and Ehud Barak came to the United States and talked fiercely about how they were going to close a few dozen “illegal outposts” by hook or by crook in the hope that the continuing settlement building would go unremarked.
Obama and his inner circle, well aware that some of these “illegal” outposts had been “closed” repeatedly and that in any case were provided with water, roads, electricity and security by the various government departments, were less impressed. They all sang from the same hymn sheet: no building in the Occupied Territories.
It is a measure of how much Israeli governments have got away with that this one is indignant about US “diktats”, when one of the Israeli commitments in the famous road map is a halt to settlement building.
Netanyahu and his government wanted to talk about alleged Palestinian failures to follow road map commitments. Obama’s officials keep reminding them that the US supports the two-state solution. Netanyahu and most of his cabinet have consistently opposed a Palestinian state, which somewhat devalues their complaints about Palestinian reluctance to admit it was a good thing they were thrown out of their homes. Obama even had the chutzpah to remind Israel of its repeated promises to open the gates to Gaza.
Equally, on the quality versus width dimension, Israeli complaints about the potential for Iran to become a nuclear power are disingenuous. Iran does not have nuclear weapons while Israel has several hundred of them and refuses to sign the NPT. Imagine the shock when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton – of all people – suggested that they should sign up.
In all of this, Israeli indignation is necessarily forced and strained. All they are being asked to do is to abide by their own promises, let alone by international law.
Obama’s cautious and non-confrontational strategy of attrition is also paying off domestically. Netanyahu spoke to the AIPAC conference, but the Israel lobby’s traditional posture went into reverse. In times past, its guiding principle was to follow whatever policy the Israeli government wanted. Now the lobby endorsed the two-state solution that the Israeli Prime Minister abhors and, after many years of swinging rightwards, thinks a liberal Democrat Congress and White House may be a good excuse for a change of tack.
One factor in this may be that there is now an alternative Israel lobby. J-Street, only recently founded, has made great inroads. Despite the lack of funding from conservative Zionists and Christian evangelists, it actually represents the much more nuanced, progressive and peace-tending views of most American Jews, whose support for Obama among ethnic groups is only matched by Arabs and blacks.
Administration sources are even suggesting it may be possible that, the next time the United Nations Security Council considers Israeli behaviour, Netanyahu will lose the protection of the automatic American veto that Israel has enjoyed for four presidential terms.
Such a course of action would send a message to the Israeli electorate that there are serious consequences to having a racist government. With a few exceptions, Israelis know their country’s existence, and their living standards have depended on American financial and military support.
With bills in the Knesset from cabinet members threatening to disenfranchise non-Jews, Netanyahu’s guaranteed combative statements, Congressional support for Likud will fade.
And the economic crisis even offers opportunity. If Obama, more in sorrow than in anger, is forced to threaten cuts in US aid to Israel, he simply has to ask embattled voters whether they really want to send taxpayers’ money to an ungrateful nation that refuses to live up to its commitments and flies in the face of accepted US and international policies. Never mind the quantity, just watch the width of the gap.
June 8, 2009 12:00
Reversing Bill Clinton’s election dictum, Barack Obama shows an admirable attention span. “It’s not just the economy, stupid.” No one can accuse him of neglecting the economy, but one of the lessons being reinforced is that he needs to pull the political process with him. This is particularly important when the Democratic Party in Congress has a vociferous and disloyal group of rightists who will vote with the Republicans at the drop of a hat in the name of moderation.
That is one of the explanations for Obama’s incremental strategy on the Middle East. Faced with the most obtuse and self-centred set of Israeli leaders, he has to cover his rear carefully and so far the Likud-led coalition of zealots is playing into his hands.
Readers of a certain age may remember David Kossof on television playing a Jewish tailor whose watchword was “Never mind the quality – feel the width.” He seems to have written the script for recent Israeli diplomacy, which has been predicated on talking to politicians who truly and sincerely want the wool pulled over their eyes.
Things have changed. Binyamin Netanyahu came to see Obama and wanted a quick deadline for an attack on Iran. Despite his crowing, he got a promise of open-ended negotiations with Tehran and a warning that the Americans thought that settlement building was a more urgent problem. He and Ehud Barak came to the United States and talked fiercely about how they were going to close a few dozen “illegal outposts” by hook or by crook in the hope that the continuing settlement building would go unremarked.
Obama and his inner circle, well aware that some of these “illegal” outposts had been “closed” repeatedly and that in any case were provided with water, roads, electricity and security by the various government departments, were less impressed. They all sang from the same hymn sheet: no building in the Occupied Territories.
It is a measure of how much Israeli governments have got away with that this one is indignant about US “diktats”, when one of the Israeli commitments in the famous road map is a halt to settlement building.
Netanyahu and his government wanted to talk about alleged Palestinian failures to follow road map commitments. Obama’s officials keep reminding them that the US supports the two-state solution. Netanyahu and most of his cabinet have consistently opposed a Palestinian state, which somewhat devalues their complaints about Palestinian reluctance to admit it was a good thing they were thrown out of their homes. Obama even had the chutzpah to remind Israel of its repeated promises to open the gates to Gaza.
Equally, on the quality versus width dimension, Israeli complaints about the potential for Iran to become a nuclear power are disingenuous. Iran does not have nuclear weapons while Israel has several hundred of them and refuses to sign the NPT. Imagine the shock when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton – of all people – suggested that they should sign up.
In all of this, Israeli indignation is necessarily forced and strained. All they are being asked to do is to abide by their own promises, let alone by international law.
Obama’s cautious and non-confrontational strategy of attrition is also paying off domestically. Netanyahu spoke to the AIPAC conference, but the Israel lobby’s traditional posture went into reverse. In times past, its guiding principle was to follow whatever policy the Israeli government wanted. Now the lobby endorsed the two-state solution that the Israeli Prime Minister abhors and, after many years of swinging rightwards, thinks a liberal Democrat Congress and White House may be a good excuse for a change of tack.
One factor in this may be that there is now an alternative Israel lobby. J-Street, only recently founded, has made great inroads. Despite the lack of funding from conservative Zionists and Christian evangelists, it actually represents the much more nuanced, progressive and peace-tending views of most American Jews, whose support for Obama among ethnic groups is only matched by Arabs and blacks.
Administration sources are even suggesting it may be possible that, the next time the United Nations Security Council considers Israeli behaviour, Netanyahu will lose the protection of the automatic American veto that Israel has enjoyed for four presidential terms.
Such a course of action would send a message to the Israeli electorate that there are serious consequences to having a racist government. With a few exceptions, Israelis know their country’s existence, and their living standards have depended on American financial and military support.
With bills in the Knesset from cabinet members threatening to disenfranchise non-Jews, Netanyahu’s guaranteed combative statements, Congressional support for Likud will fade.
And the economic crisis even offers opportunity. If Obama, more in sorrow than in anger, is forced to threaten cuts in US aid to Israel, he simply has to ask embattled voters whether they really want to send taxpayers’ money to an ungrateful nation that refuses to live up to its commitments and flies in the face of accepted US and international policies. Never mind the quantity, just watch the width of the gap.
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