Showing posts with label Hitler. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hitler. Show all posts

Friday, March 07, 2014

Onward, Onward Rode the Rogues: a mother lode of patriotic taurine excreta.


Ian Williams

Tribune Written By: Ian Williams
Published: March 7, 2014 Last modified: March 5, 2014

Vladimir Putin’s actions in Crimea are perilously close to tearing up rules that have kept us “the peoples of the world from the scourge of war.”
Both sides in the conflict will be invoking the United Nations Charter, which enshrines the inviolability of sovereign states and their borders – unlike the League of Nations, which was surprisingly active at redrawing borders after Versailles. The root of the problem is the weird West European notion of the nation state – a Procrustean construct in which populations had to be cut or stretched to fit homogeneously into a frame predetermined by nationalist ideologues. The French probably invented it – at a time when more than half their population did not speak French.
Looking at the Ottomans and the Hapsburgs almost leads to nostalgia, albeit with many qualifications. In their different ways, they at least provided for linguistic and ethnic diversity within one polity, which the European Union (despite its failings) also offers.
Boris Yeltsin’s power grab in Moscow led to the chaotic dissolution of the Soviet Union, leaving far too many questions unanswered, not least of which were the rights of minorities. A shared EU style citizenship, dual nationalities, linguistic rights should all have been negotiated – not to mention open borders.
Decolonisation in both Africa and the former Soviet Union led to many absurdities based on respect for existing boundaries whether drawn up by tipsy District Commissioners in Africa or playful commissars in the Soviet Union following Stalin’s. One of Stalin’s little jokes, Nagorno Karabagh, stranding an enclave of Armenians in Azerbaijan, is a classic unresolved issue that cannot be solved without adjusting borders.
So what of Ukraine? During the Balkan Wars, Bogdan Denitch, who represented the Democratic Socialists of America at the Socialist International, often quoted the Balkan formula: “Why should I be a minority in your country, when you could be a minority in mine?” It seems to be doing sterling service in the Ukraine now.
If only Putin were as sedulous about the rights of, say, Chechens, as he is about Russian speakers in the Crimea. Or if Moscow had shown any respect for the rights of the Crimean Tartars. But then the respect for Iraqi sovereignty shown by George W Bush and Tony Blair is hardly a good example. Experience suggests that people believe in their own right to self-determination but are less convinced about the rights of others. Ask a typical Indian about Kashmiri rights, an Argentinean about Falkland Islanders, or a Moroccan about Western Sahara, and the chances are you will hit a mother lode of patriotic taurine excreta.
While many at the time would agree that the Sudeten Germans had been deprived of their right to self-determination, there is a consensus that Hitler’s “liberation” of them broke all the rules. It was the Nazis flouting of the rules against aggression and conquest that led to the UN Charter’s emphasis on sovereignty – which has been reasonably successful so far in averting a third world.
There are more questions than answers in the Ukraine. Its capital, Kiev, was the core of what became the Russian state. There were Polish, Lithuanian and Russian states on what is now Ukrainian territory but until 1917 there had been no independent Ukrainian polity. Ironically, Ukraine owes its present territory to Stalin and his joint invasion with Hitler in of Poland in 1939.
But the Ukrainian ultra-nationalists, with their anti-Russian language moves, are not exactly paragons of toleration. If Ukraine has a right to national self-determination, then why don’t the constituent parts also have the same right? There is nothing in the UN Charter to stop boundaries being changed – but not by force. There are other ways. One is negotiation, from first principles with consultation and protection for all the parties on the ground. The other is the EU approach, which has been remarkably successful in making the borders meaningless for all but administrative purposes. If Britain and the new Europe can remain economically part of the EU while grovelling politically to Washington, Ukraine can join the EU without joining Nato and while maintaining the close political relations it needs with Russia. After all, those Ukrainian nationalists still want Russian gas to keep them warm.

Sunday, September 23, 2012

Like-Minded Traitors to Their Class


a journal of modern society & culture

Orwell and MacDonald: Like-Minded Traitors to Their Class

The long-lasting relationship between George Orwell and Dwight Macdonald is at once intriguing and illuminating. On a personal level, one can see the strong personal affinity and similarities of temperament between them, but on the political level their political disagreements on an issue so fundamental as the Second World War were equally apparent, especially in the early wartime years. While both benefited intellectually from the exchange it was clear that Macdonald’s position shifted closer to that of Orwell’s but with sufficient detachment to make him a more convincing exponent of his British colleague’s ideas to American audiences.
Partisan Review seems to have been Orwell’s first contact with the American Left and Macdonald. Cyril Connelly’s estranged wife, Jean Bakewell, had left London for New York and was having an affair with PR editor Clement Greenberg. She recommended Orwell, whom she had known in London as a London Correspondent for the magazine. It is possible that she inadvertently misrepresented his views, which had changed rapidly from opposition to war as it loomed in 1939, to support for the war after the Hitler-Stalin pact in August of that year. Others have credited Macdonald with the initiative and Greenberg did indeed seem to walk in his shadow.
In any case, Greenberg, whose anti-war views marched in step with Macdonald’s, invited Orwell’s London Letter at the end of 1940 and the first one appeared in the Spring of 1941, but afterwards it seems to be Philip Rahv who carried the organizational burden of corresponding with Orwell.
Ironically, in view of the close relationship that he and Orwell later maintained, it was Macdonald’s uncompromising anti-war position and his attempts to secure ripostes to Orwell’s pro-war letters in Partisan Review that finally led to Macdonald’s break from the other editors, William Philips and Philip Rahv and his launch of Politics. However, his equally uncompromising idiosyncrasy immediately led him to invite Orwell to write for his new publication and indeed to hold him up as a model for the new publication.
Despite the growing personal empathy between Orwell and Macdonald, it was clear that on the question of the war that Orwell was much closer to the outlook of other Partisan Review editors. The duality of their relationship is perhaps summarized in Orwell’s letter to Rahv in which he promises to keep sending political items to the Partisan Review, but would confine his contributions to politics to cultural subjects.  (CW III p 71).
But despite the paucity of direct Orwell contributions to politics, it is clear that his influence on Macdonald grew, especially in the post-war years when the British writer’s anti-totalitarian books and essays resonated strongly with the American’s increasingly anarchist tendencies. Macdonald almost became Orwell’s amanuensis in the USA, and teased from him in his correspondence some of the more definitive statements of Orwell’s continuing socialist ideals.
Partisan Review
Partisan Review was originally the magazine of the John Reed Clubs, which gathered writers and workers in what could certainly be called a front organization for the Communist Party. In 1935, the clubs were wound up as a new line issued from Moscow and the magazine faltered and folded.
In December 1937, Rahv and Philips relaunched it, joined by Mary McCarthy, Dwight Macdonald, and his old friends, Frederick W. Dupee and George Morris. The board were making their break from the Communist Party, in both politics and cultural outlook.
The political genealogy of the people who made Partisan Review a powerhouse for left and liberal intellectual life in America was somewhat complex. It, and the New York intellectuals who surrounded it, drew on several streams. One was the older “Menshevik” tradition of social-democracy which was especially strong among Jews. However, it suffered from an image problem compared with the Communists and their Trotskyist offspring. The October revolution was romantic and stirring, and pulled at the heartstrings in a way that various forms of Fabianism or Menshevism could not. In the words of 1066 And All That, the Bolsheviks were like the Cavaliers in the English Civil War, “Wrong but Wromantic.”
Many of them joined the Communist Party, but throughout the thirties, members left in disillusion with the news from the Soviet Union,  and many of them thought Trotsky could best explain and express their doubts about how to square the circle: how to reconcile the promise of October with the real horrors that were developing in the Socialist Motherland.
Some Trotskyists had joined, or rather infiltrated, the Socialist Party of the USA, which had in times past had some modest electoral success with its Social Democratic platform and its labor connections. By the time the Socialist Party had succeeded in shaking the infiltrators off, they had ruined its political future by driving away many of the labor activists and officials whose presence distinguished the party from the Leninist organizations. However, the expellees succeeded, in their own terms, since they took more people in the party than they went in with, and if the host died in this process of reproduction by fission, from their point of view it was a blow for the revolution.
The expellees formed the Socialist Workers Party, which was tied directly to Trotsky. But it seems to be inherent in such groups that, like amoebae, they split once they reach a certain size. The comrades who left to found the Workers Party took their anti-Stalinism a stage further than their mentor, Trotsky. He defended the Soviet Union, which after all he had done so much to create and shape, It was, he said, still a workers’ state, albeit degenerated. Max Shachtman, Irving Howe, Macdonald, and others thought this was being too kind. They retained their fierce revolutionary belief, but decided that the Soviet Union was past redemption and indefensible.
In this totally sectarian milieu, any deviation from “the line” was anathema, and so splits, expulsions and denunciations were, and have in fact remained, the currency of Trotskyist politics ever since – the precise nature of the Soviet Union being a favorite litmus test – but of course the nature of the Second World War then unfolding became another, with the orthodox Trotskyist position agreeing for once with the Communists that this was an imperialist war, to be opposed by workers everywhere. Of course, the Communist Party changed its collective opinion when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union.
That sectarian purity allowed Irving Howe, for example, after he had joined the  board of Partisan Review to denounce in fairly typical polemical style the “uniformly pro-imperialist letters” from England, particularly the “preposterous statement – fit for the garbage pails,” from George Orwell, that “to be anti-war in England today, is to be pro-Hitler.”
Dwight Macdonald
In contrast to the archetypal New York intellectuals like Howe, who came from poor but aspiring Jewish families and who were steeped in politics almost from childhood, Dwight Macdonald came late to sectarian politics, was somewhat idiosyncratic in his exposition and practice of it while he was associated, and left earlier. In fact he was also a decade or so older than Howe’s generation.
Rather than a product of tuition-free City College in New York, Macdonald was an alumnus of Philips and Yale, and the scion of two generations of lawyers. His background as a founder writer for Fortune was almost diametrically opposed to the intensely socialist education and experience of many of his new comrades and colleagues.
Like many intellectuals, he had become associated with the Communist Party in the mid thirties until events in the Soviet Union such as the Moscow Trials led to a growing dissatisfaction with the party line and an increasing interest in Trotsky and his analysis of the events back in the socialist motherland.
So Macdonald overtly joined the Socialist Workers Party in 1939, and did so with the fervor of a new-born convert – but with the critical faculties of someone who had grown up outside the movement. He was much less inclined to agree that two and two made five just because the Party and its leaders said so, not least because he had independent life and reputation outside.
Although Partisan Review certainly had overt political leanings, its strength was that it eschewed strict party lines and orthodoxies. It tended towards Trotsky’s side in the great schism, but the exiled leader was not much more tolerant of dissent than his Communist opponents, and took Macdonald to task for allowing the magazine to stray too far from the class struggle and orthodoxy – and for having the temerity to disagree with him.
“Everyone has the right to be stupid, but Comrade Macdonald abuses the privilege,” declared Trotsky with his typical polemical flair. Indeed, one of his last works before he was assassinated in 1940 was a reply to Macdonald.(Whitfield p 20)
Certainly, Macdonald was temperamentally unsuited to the Party that he had  joined. In full conspiratorial mode, members took party names and his was “James Joyce,” perhaps in deference to someone who attracts exegesis almost as complex as Trotsky. As Macdonald said of his membership, where he was penning internal polemics almost as soon as writing out the membership form, he was “either high minded, or arrogant, or naive, or just plain schitzy, maybe a bit of each.”
Indeed, Macdonald’s patrician self-confidence and gadfly independence in the face of attempts to rein him in do lead irresistibly to comparisons with P. G. Wodehouse’s Comrade Psmith (where the “P” is silent) – effective, supremely confident,  but doubtless infuriating and exasperating for the comrades.
Why did they put up with each other?  Macdonald’s journalistic skills, and avenues to the outside world were obviously useful even for somewhat claustrophobic and incestuous sectarian world of Trotsky’s followers. For his part, Macdonald revealed the attractions of Trotsky for many of the New York intellectuals, clearly still visible decades later in, for example, Irving Howe’s biography of the revolutionary (Leon Trotsky, 1978). Macdonald noted that Trotsky showed that that “intellectuals, too, could make history.”
Macdonald’s short sojourn with the SWP, and then the Workers Party as the Trotskyist factions split on points of theological nicety, placed him briefly in the mainstream of the “New York intellectuals” who frequently had shared such sectarian experiences.
However, few of them were as quick as he was to conclude that Trotskyism was “a variant of Stalinism” as the Old Man and his followers remained unrepentant about the inherent flaws in Bolshevik methodology. As Whitfield points out, for Macdonald, “extirpation of dissent was the most offensive aspect of Trotskyism,” especially when set in the context of how the Soviet Union developed.
Orwell and Partisan Review
Despite the generally Trotskyist ambience of Partisan Review, the people around the magazine were probably the closest group that Orwell could relate to in the United States, not least because of the literary and aesthetic tastes he shared with them.
Certainly his denunciation of the Soviet and Communist behavior in Spain gave them a common enemy in Stalin and his followers. Although Orwell, despite numerous posthumous academic attempts to co-opt him as one, was never a Trotskyist, his experiences in Catalonia had crystallized his growing anti-Soviet feelings, which he himself dated back to 1935.
On a political level, the Moscow Trials of alleged traitors, the stifling or outright suppression of dissident artists, many of whom did not even know they were dissident until the Secret Police knocked on their doors, had left erstwhile admirers of the Soviet experiment the choices of repudiation, or rationalization.
Both Orwell and the Partisan Review editors went for repudiation of the developments in the Soviet Union, and its effect on socialism abroad, notably in Spain. Additionally, as intellectuals, they also broke with new Soviet cultural policy and its renunciation of the modernist movements of the previous decades.
It is perhaps significant that Clement Greenberg, who was to first invite Orwell as a contributor, was more interested in the literary and cultural aspects of the magazine. Typically, Orwell, Macdonald and others around Partisan Review, shared an appreciation for T.S. Eliot, by no means a leftist.
Indeed Eliot was denounced as “Anti-people, and fascist-minded,” by more orthodox Communist Party critics. (Wald  94). But the Partisan Review circle had all escaped the tyranny of Socialist Realism which tried to judge aesthetic creation by its political orthodoxy, and Orwell, for example, met Eliot in a professional capacity, not least by having him as a frequent guest on his BBC Indian Service program. On the other side of the Atlantic,  Partisan Review published two of the Four Quartets– a strange venue indeed for an Episcopalian monarchist who has posthumously had to contend with accusations of anti-Semitism!
Despite this affinity, there were at the beginning strong disagreements on the war, with Macdonald and Greenberg taking particularly strongly orthodox Marxist antiwar positions – and as suggested earlier, it is possible that their initial invitation to Orwell may have been based on outdated news of his previous positions.
Although before the war, Orwell had taken a similar “plague on all their houses,” attitude as the American revolutionaries, he rapidly moved to a position of trying to combine a social revolution and defeating Hitler, and eventually to an even more sanguine position, that winning the war, with or without a revolution, and almost certainly without, was the most important thing.
 Newsinger (op Cit 99) makes the point that the somewhat idiosyncratic response of Partisan Review to their disagreements about the War – namely not to mention it themselves – allowed Orwell’s view in his London Letters to become the default position for the magazine, which certainly brought it closer to reality, and the views of the mainstream society.
Indeed, Orwell’s political development in the early forties was in part spurred by the experiences that he shared with so many compatriots during a total war that left little or no social experience untouched. It was not just bombs, and the Home Guard, but the taxation, the rationing, the military and labor conscription, which at least blurred and on occasion transcended existing class differences and suggested that socialism and the nation state were compatible without descending to national socialism or communism.
In fact, the war was also a life and death issue personally for Orwell, who from his experiences in Spain knew that at least two possible outcomes: either a Nazi victory or a Communist takeover, would have him standing against a wall, with the ever present possibility that any wall he stood near in the meantime may be brought down by German bombers.
Understandably, living in a country faced with annihilation, it was difficult for Orwell to treat the war as if it were some Marxist version of the Athanasian creed, simply a marker for true belief. “The issue was between having a war and letting Germany dominate Europe up to the Urals,” he reprimanded Macdonald.
Indeed Macdonald’s purist attitude to the war, hoping that the fascists would be defeated but denying the moral validity of British or American capitalist attempts to do so, is a part of a long lasting idealistic tradition in the American left, seen most recently in attitudes to possible intervention in the Balkans or Rwanda. Macdonald eventually grew out of this habit of magnanimously bearing the suffering of others until a champion with the correct politics could be identified. Much of the American left didn’t.
Personal Politics
Even though Partisan Review was certainly an ecumenical operation, it is interesting to see how the epistolary relationship between Macdonald and Orwell developed despite such profound political disagreements. There were clearly other factors than a theoretical convergence that kept them corresponding although that is almost certainly one of the results of their exchanges.
The intimacy of the surviving correspondence implies a much more extensive now missing communication, whether from the letters about mundane details such as loans, shoes and book purchases, or the developing literary and political affinities. In the days before readily available transatlantic phone calls, and in the absence of a physical meeting, the degree of rapport between the two, even allowing for Macdonald’s clubbable personality, suggests that there were many other letters now lost.
Macdonald’s predication of the need for his new magazine politics, in which he sought to emulate Orwell, while justifying it by Partisan Review’s failure to tackle Orwell’s politics was the dialectic stretched beyond rational synthesis.
However, it is clear that Macdonald agreed with Orwell’s overall world view, while disagreeing with its particular manifestation in support for the “imperialist war.” One has to have experienced the cultish world of unforgiving far-left politics to appreciate how rare such subtleties were.
Their relationship was also explicable in terms of shared temperament. Michael Wreszin probably had it right when he concluded that “Dwight loved Orwell… for the enemies he had made.”  (108 A Rebel in Defense of Tradition) They shared an idiosyncratic intellectual viewpoint, in each case based upon a formidable intellect, and similar class origins.
As Sumner says, Macdonald saw in Orwell, “A fellow exile from the cloister of class privilege and private schools, a writer whose work combined empathy for the suffering of the dispossessed (which he witnessed at close range, on the streets of Paris and London and among the POUMist forces in Spain) with a plain writing style purged of ideological cant and hyperbole.” (21 Sumner)
In fact, despite his criticisms, it was precisely Orwell’s empiricism, his contact with reality that attracted Macdonald, and maybe even made him somewhat envious, albeit not to the extent of say, paralleling the Road to Wigan Pier with a similar expedition to the Appalachian mines!
Orwell and Macdonald both came from elite positions in their related Anglo-Saxon societies that assumed their members had authority by birth, background and education. Their easy self-assurance even when the vicissitudes of family life and business cycles had eroded the economic basis for their self-assurance suggests that this was a caste as much as a class position. That assurance allowed them the idiosyncrasy to adopt positions that increasingly paralleled each other’s despite the pressure from others to hew to rigid lines.
Orwell’s seemingly consciously adopted persona of a crusty Tory, nostalgically assuming that the world is going to hell in a hand basket, certainly became more attractive than it already was to Macdonald, who was an overt Anglophile, who commented to a British editor in 1958 “I prefer your country morally and culturally to my own.” (Discrimination 387)
From Jonathan  Swift to William Cobbett and right up to the present, British radicals have often used a fictional former golden age to make odious comparisons with the benighted present. Some modern critics fail to see how this aspect of Orwell could in reality be quite radical. Indeed, even the Levellers of the English Revolutionary period saw their demands as a restoration of ancient liberties rather than as innovation.
It is not surprising that Macdonald imagined (149 Wreszin) that Orwell shares his “private enthusiasm” for Doctor Johnson, and it would have been a fitting presumption since the Good Doctor was the epitome of the curmudgeonly Tory critic of his own age. Yale Alumnus Macdonald certainly fitted the bill from an American standpoint.
Perhaps equally indicative was Macdonald’s comment about the British on Lord Melbourne’s insouciant acceptance of the prime ministership, almost on a dare, “only a race as much at home in politics as a fish is in water could be so offhand about it.”
His anarchist comrade George Woodcock in his 1946 essay for Politics, described Orwell as a  “rare survivor in the atomic age” referring to his “old fashioned pragmatism,” “his radical honesty and frankness, his respect for such excellent bourgeois mottoes as ‘fair play” and “don’t kick a man when he’s down.” In fact, he has pinpointed exactly the persona of the crusty Tory radical that Orwell was happy to present.
It is instructive that for some left critics of Orwell, notably Scott Lucas, his “decency” is the occasion for a sneer and an insult. In contrast, for most British workers, it is a sine qua non political principle As Orwell knew, Woodcock’s description is of precisely the virtues that the British working class considers its own, and why they have reacted so well when they are displayed, as they often have been by a whole British political spectrum.
James Maxton, Michael Foot, former editor of Tribune and later leader of the Labour Party, all had these qualities. This is what put them and their left politics in the mainstream of the British political tradition, because unlike the purer American ideologues, these virtues appealed to the British working class and won their votes, along with those of many of the middle classes as well.
 Politics
In 1943, when their disagreements about the war were at their sharpest, Macdonald’s draft prospectus for his new magazine, politics, designed to remedy the failings that he saw in Partisan Review, pledged “to try to do for (the) USA scene what Orwell does for London.” At a time when Orwell was not the eminence he later gained in Britain itself, Macdonald had already recognized his special skills and indeed made a sterling effort towards his goal of emulation.
In fact, the clear influence that Orwell had on Macdonald’s politics belies his relatively minute direct contributions to politics itself. Macdonald later told an Anarchist journal that Orwell was “a liblab (tho’ of the finest quality in my opinion), I’m a radical; he supported the late war, I didn’t; he has hopes for the Labor Party. I haven’t.”(Sumner 23) Even the term liblab, a Macdonald neologism in its American sense, was a British term referring to the period at the turn of the 19th  Century when Labor candidates for parliament stood on a Liberal Party ticket.
On the other hand, although he later recommended Macdonald’s magazine, Orwell could not agree with the “policy of this paper, which is antiwar, not from a pacifist angle, but I admire its combination of highbrow political analysis with intelligent literary criticism.” (CW III 202) Interestingly he likens it to the British New Leader – which was the journal of the Independent Labour Party – an organization that, as we shall see later, had figured largely in Orwell’s own political development.
In fact the politics of politics moved closer to Orwell than any of the parties at its inception concerned could really imagine.
Orwell was from Britain, Macdonald was from America
When we compare Orwell’s place in British politics and society with that of Macdonald and the New York intellectuals in the United States, we can perhaps see why so many more of the latter dropped any pretensions to socialism – and perhaps why, despite inauspicious beginnings, Macdonald and Orwell grew closer.
Sadly, in the U.S. with the demise of the Socialist Party, there really was no practical alternative role for socialists in effective daily political life, although many carried on trying. Those, like Irving Howe, who kept the faith did so in their role as intellectuals, which is why almost the last strongholds of any kind of socialist belief in the USA are now in academia. In Britain, there clearly was an alternative, and editors and writers of left wing magazines naturally made the transition into parliament and the cabinet, as did union leaders and activists.
In contrast, many of the New York intellectuals were isolated within their own American society, although Macdonald’s WASP upbringing, and his previous journalistic career probably connected him more closely to the wider society than was likely for his comrades.
Macdonald eventually realized that Orwell was rooted in a more homogeneous political and literary society, and that his views were shared by much broader sections of his society. Certainly, Orwell did not need Trotsky’s inspiration to think that a different form of socialism from Stalin’s was possible. In Britain, the Trotskyists were always a marginal growth in an already large and successful working class socialist movement with strong social roots in the unions and churches.
In particular, overlooked by many commentators on Orwell’s politics is the important role of the Independent Labour Party, which had left the Labour Party, but still had a relatively widespread base, and indeed still had many close connections and sympathizers inside the Labour Party itself.
It held what it called a “Third Way” position between Leninism and Labour Party right’s reformism, which is, of course, not to be confused with Tony Blair’s and Bill Clinton’s later appropriation of the title.
As an example, Newsinger, (p 89 Newsinger) says that “the claim that he (Orwell) became a Tribune socialist, as supporter of the Labour left is too simplistic. It neglects the extent to which Orwell conducted a dialogue with the revolutionary left.”
However, this in its turn imposes a retrospective and anachronistic conflation of “revolutionary” with Leninist. The ILP believed that an elected Labour Party, could “suppress (counter-revolution) by ordinary legal power backed by a Labour organization,” (Brown 182) and could effect the revolutionary change to socialism.
Indeed their claim to a distinctively “British Road to Socialism,” backed by mass organizations, was later usurped by the Communist Party of Great Britain itself, even down to the name.
Reinforced by the shared experience of war, this is clearly the same political wellspring that Orwell was drawing on, when he declared, “England is the only European country where internal politics are conducted in a more or less humane and decent manner.” He claimed, along with the ILP, that it “would be possible to abolish poverty without destroying liberty,” and its people were  “more capable than most people of making revolutionary changes without bloodshed.” (See The English People,  CW III) The emphasis of the ILP was just this, the abolition of poverty in the course of a massive makeover of society.
As if to prove their point, in the course of the Second World War, the British government had seized control of the economy and directed it towards the war effort to an extent far beyond anything that even Nazi Germany had managed. Draconian rationing and taxation had, unchallenged by the rich, brought about a serious leveling, indicating what was possible in peacetime.
Newsinger refers to Orwell’s comments to the convergence of the parties as if it proves Orwell’s dissatisfaction with Labour. In fact, to put it in context, he celebrated such convergence as an example of a distinctive and implicitly better way of doing things. Orwell goes on to explain, “Thus, no Conservative government will ever revert to what would have been called conservatism in the nineteenth century. No Socialist government will massacre the propertied class, nor even expropriate them without compensation.” (Op cit 29)
Proper appreciation of the ILP connection erodes Newsinger’s concept of Orwell as a “literary Trotskyist,” It was the ILP that made the connections for him to go to Spain and join the militia of the POUM, which may indeed have leaned more to Trotsky – but was certainly roundly denounced by him.
Indeed, it was ILP leaders like Fenner Brockway who introduced him to Secker and Warburg for publication of Homage to Catalonia, and later Animal Farm when the more communist-inclined Victor Gollancz demurred at Orwell’s political direction.
Showing the same humanistic approach that Orwell certainly shared, and in a way anticipating the theme of 1984, the ILP’s leader, James Maxton MP, in his last major speech in 1945, repudiated statist versions of socialism, declaring, “We must not allow ourselves to become ants in an anthill.” (Maxton, Gordon Brown, Mainstream Publishing p 302)
Their positions on the war were, also initially, reflected by Orwell and many ILP leaders, such as Maxton, continued to oppose the “imperialist” war with Germany without, however, ever subscribing to the Soviet embrace of their new Nazi ally. However, after several years of war, the ILP remnants had mostly either joined the Communist Party, or more often returned to the Labour Party, where many of its ex-members were in the first post-war Labour cabinet, and for years afterwards formed part of the left Caucus of the Party. There, they usually organized around Tribune, the independent paper for which Orwell wrote so much.
Like many others, Orwell left the ILP during the war, and although we are unsure whether or not he actually joined the Labour Party, he certainly canvassed for it in the May 1945 election that returned it, self declared socialist party, to power with a massive majority. Right up to his death, as we know in his attempts to correct American misapprehensions about the purpose of 1984, he described himself a supporter of the Party and the government.
So Orwell was part of broad and generally relatively non-sectarian left, with strong social roots. He retained his old school and class connections and their contacts with decision-makers, and indeed through his Labour party connections added more as people connected with Tribune or the ILP joined both the wartime coalition cabinet and the post-war Labour government.
Macdonald himself recognized this social homogeneity when he eventually went to Britain after the war. “When I lived in London last winter, I noticed that I actually met trade union leaders and members of Parliament at parties and that intellectuals were part of the political life.” In contrast, he says, “A New York intellectual even in the politicalized thirties and forties had no contact with Congressmen or government officials or businessmen or labor leaders.” (386 Discrimination).
Macdonald certainly had no such broad-based non-sectarian left with access to power that Orwell could fall back on and it is hardly surprising that for a long period he was regarded as “apolitical”– since in the American context, his choice was between sectarian irrelevance or reconciliation with reaction.
A Writer’s Life
Having eschewed the organizational forms of sectarianism, Macdonald reverted to what he did best – thought-provoking journalism. It has been suggested that Orwell was more politically pure, in that, unlike Macdonald, he did not, until much later write for the mainstream press.
However, this may be more a symptom of artistic than political purity. Orwell self-consciously wanted to be a writer, not a reporter (a fairly plebeian occupation, certainly in Britain). Even though, as Macdonald said, he had a flair for sociological reporting, this was in terms of collecting material for larger projects.
For Orwell, writing reviews for literary journals was both a means of turning a crust and getting his name out. He never did a Comstock as far as we know, preferring the dubious alternatives of small holdings and country shop keeping to writing for the tabloids and commercial press. In fact, Macdonald obliged Orwell by finding him copies of George Gissing novels in New York. New Grub Street’s depiction of the struggling writer resonated strongly with Orwell.
However, the life of a Grub Street hack was not one of luxury or stability and one reason for Orwell’s extensive contacts with American intellectuals was of course the famous rationale for robbing banks – that is where the money was! Those dollar checks, as well as doing sterling patriotic duty by bringing in foreign exchange for the war efforts, kept Orwell solvent in the years before Animal Farm began to rescue him from shabby gentility. Indeed, it was its American publication that launched him from genteel poverty to such affluence that he had to form a company to avoid punitive double taxation of the royalties.
In Britain throughout the war, there was rationing, of clothes, food and even paper. There was the blitz, and absolute mobilization to a degree that was unprecedented for a capitalist society. Production was completely geared to the war effort, which is presumably why Orwell had to ask Macdonald to get him a pair of size twelve shoes in the US – and to send them separately since shoes were valuable commodities that could be pilfered in transit.
Macdonald seems to have kept Orwell supplied with literature from the US, including, of course, his own worlds such as the one on Wallace. “One cannot buy magazines from abroad nowadays,” Orwell recorded baldly in 1944, even as he recommended Politics to Tribune readers. (III 202)
But what about the politics?
By the post-war period, Macdonald’s flirtation with Anarchism and Gandhi also converged towards, but never quite touched, Orwell’s growing fears about the powers of the state and his revulsion against tyranny. As always, Orwell was more empirical in his approach than Macdonald’s typically root and branch approach.
Despite the unpromisingly uncompromising start, Macdonald shed Marxist  dogma faster than most of his comrades of the era, and reverted to what one may consider the native Anglo-American empiricism that, with more than a flavor of Psmithian idiosyncrasy and eccentricity, he shared with Orwell. At the end of the war, Macdonald was admitting that Orwell was right about it. Their shared attitudes lent themselves to a consistency that was difficult to match by some of their more expedient contemporaries. Both opposed the vindictiveness of post-war witch-hunts against alleged Nazis and Communists.
Orwell’s defense of P. G. Wodehouse and his distaste at the attacks on alleged collaborators in France, marched in harmony with Macdonald’s editorial in support of the first Bollingen Prize for poetry going Ezra Pound, which annoyed many Jewish intellectuals, for obvious reasons, but amusingly also irritated Pound himself who Macdonald playfully recorded, “Scrawled a note so vituperative and hot-tempered that I took a great personal liking to him.”(Wreszin 169)
Indeed that comment inadvertently reveals one of the differences between Macdonald and Orwell despite so many similarities: it is difficult to think of Orwell, despite the wry smile in many of his portraits, being quite so whimsical as Macdonald so often was, allowing his characteristic lightness of touch to detract sometimes from the seriousness of his message.
The incident also showed some finer tuning on Orwell’s part, compared with Macdonald’s delight in tweaking the feathers of orthodoxy. He felt the prize awarders should have repudiated Pound’s politics even if they did give him the award for his poetry. (Partisan  Review May 1949  CW IV p 551
Macdonald went to the nub of the issue. “Orwell’s code was a simple one, based on truth and ‘decency’; he was important- and original- because he insisted on applying that code to his own socialist comrades as well as the class enemy.” (Macdonald, Discrimination, p 330)
He elaborated the reasons for this later in Trotsky, Orwell and Socialism, where he made the contrast between “the British empiricist versus the Russian-Jewish ideologue.”  “Trotsky applied a consistent and taken-for-granted doctrine to each new situation, showing the greatest ingenuity in each application but never modifying the basic dogma. Orwell, a trueborn Englishman, had no talent for systematic thinking, and, indeed, tended to regard over-all ideologies as either absurd or harmful, or both: he was always ready to abandon on his most cherished beliefs if he came to the conclusion that it no longer ‘worked.’”
In fact, Whitfield describes Macdonald himself in very similar terms. The founder of politics and berater of liblabs was he says, “certainly no theorist, no purveyor of overarching visions, no schematic thinker….his remarkably engaging and lucid style denied to its author the indulgence granted to clumsier writers, who are often beneficiaries of the belief that behind impenetrable prose they must be thinking.” (Whitfield 3)
Indeed the road that Macdonald had embarked on when he first criticized Trotsky’s suppression of the Kronstadt uprising was paralleled by Orwell who noted “All the seeds of the evil were there from the start, and that things would not have been substantially different if Lenin or Trotsky had remained in control.” (Catastrophic Gradualism, p35 IV)
Like Macdonald, Orwell continued to express his revulsion for the Soviet Union  during the period in the Second World War when many saw it as expedient to soft-pedal their criticisms. While before the war, the Communist Party had the sympathy, if not always membership, of many intellectuals, once Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, followed as it was by a foolish declaration of war by Hitler on the United States, had made Soviet Union an ally, even non-Leftists widely regarded any criticism of the Soviet Union as unpatriotic.
Macdonald recounted for his readers Orwell’s difficulties in having a book review that was even mildly critical of the Soviet Union published in the Manchester Evening News. And of course, it was not only communists but the US and British establishments who tried to thwart publication and distribution of Animal Farm.
Orwell and later Macdonald moved to the shared faute de mieux position that when faced with a choice between the capitalist USA and the Soviet Union, they would support the USA, pending a hoped for genuine socialist alternative.
While Orwell, Macdonald, and much of the British left, kept a sense of perspective about their anti-Sovietism, the antithesis became the thesis for some of the New York Intellectuals and many of their contemporary anti-Stalinists in New York mutated into millennialism of another kind – neo-conservatism, which dropped the socialist aspirations while maintaining the rabid anti-Sovietism.
Politics shortly became, almost in spite of its prospectus, a repository for a non-sectarian, communitarian version of socialism, heavily influenced by anarchist and left-libertarian ideas. What linked Orwell and Macdonald most strongly was a refusal to temper criticism of totalitarian behavior for sectarian or partisan reasons. Reasons of state, party lines, class morality, were all exposed to the same rigorous critical standards.
It is a token of the closeness of their relationship that Orwell seems to have owed more than an intellectual debt to Macdonald, who graciously told him not to worry about a previous loan. He tells him in reply to what seems to be a missing anxious letter from Orwell promising repayment of the unspecified amount that may have been prompted by Macdonald’s discussion of the magazine’s financial position., “not to worry about the loans… all we meant to say was that, when repayment is convenient to you, it could be nice for us.. But we weren’t thinking of getting anything at all back in less than a year, and we perfectly understand that what you can do on it depends on how well things work out as to climate etc. So please don’t make any sacrifice, there’s no hurry at all.” (Wreszin p 179, 1949 July 19)
In fact, of course, there was. Orwell was hurrying to his grave.  We can only conjecture that this loan was from before Animal Farm’s publication helped assure Orwell’s financial position, but as Gordon Bowker points out, by then Orwell was actually lending other people money.
Letters to Oceania?
However, perhaps more important than the financial support Orwell clearly derived from his American connection, the question is how did the ideas bubbling among American intellectuals add to Orwell’s developing worldview?
One of the benefits of writing for these American magazines was, of course, that he could surmount the foreign exchange controls and Macdonald provided him with books and magazines–U-boats permitting. (p150 W), and his own essays, for example on Burnham, show that they provoked ideas in him. It is perhaps too simplistic to repudiate the influence of Burnham on the schema for Nineteen Eighty-Four. It is clear that ideas can be provoked by analyses that one disagrees with, and Burnham’s views were sufficiently provocative for Orwell to think hard about them.
It is to the continuing correspondence and relationship between Orwell and Macdonald that we owe some of the most convincing exegesis of, for example, Animal Farm, and the particular British context of the ILP illuminates what he was saying.
When asked by Macdonald if the book was antirevolutionary, he distinguished his ideas of revolution from “that kind” of revolution, (violent conspiratorial revolution, led by unconsciously power-hungry people) can only lead to a change of masters.” In effect he was continuing the ILP’s line, “You can’t have a revolution unless you make it for yourself; there is no such thing as a benevolent dictatorship.” (Letter Orwell to Macdonald Dec 1946 cited Sumner 22)
In addition, Macdonald and Orwell shared many interests, some of which were highly significant in the development of Orwell’s work. For example, both had an interest in Utopias, as shown by Macdonald’s anticipation of M.L. Berneri’s book on them in July 1949 (letter to Orwell, Wreszin 179). “A subject peculiarly close to my own current interests,” says Macdonald, but of course even more so for Orwell, whose work was to become the archetypal obverse of the genre, a Dystopia.
Such works were of course in a solid literary, and even left literary tradition, from Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backwards, William Morris’s News From Nowhere on the positive side, to Jack London’s Iron Heel and Zamyatin’s We on the darker side and Orwell at various times refers to them, along with Wells’ The Sleeper Awakes and Huxley’s Brave New World,  (See Orwell’s Prophesies of Fascism, p 45 CW ,).
One cannot help thinking that such interests may have seemed frivolous to the more dourly doctrinaire comrades on the harder left – but such literary explorations of alternative futures doubtless appealed the growing empiricism of Macdonald.
In one small matter, the correspondence was even more seminal for Orwell’s dystopic vision. The British censors had deleted a paragraph from one of his London Letters for the Partisan Review about possible lynchings of downed German airmen, and had done so by retyping the letter as if nothing had happened. It was almost certainly an inspiration for Winston Smith in his cubicle rewriting history for his daily bread.
Nineteen Eighty-Four shows some the syncretic results of this correspondence and transatlantic acquaintanceship. While Airstrip One is indeed quintessentially English, – not even British – in its setting and flavor, and it has a Soviet style political ethos mediated through that setting, it is clearly part of an Anglo-American polity which, perhaps if death had not been looming, he would have drawn a more intellectually satisfactory and coherent way.
On the wider New York Intellectual circle, it is a tenable hypothesis that between the two, they managed to create a vocabulary that escaped sectarian catchwords and stilted dogmatic thinking. It allowed the great issues of the day, in particular geopolitical issues, to be examined in a principled humanistic way that applied equal moral yardsticks to all the actors. We may take this for granted now (indeed, after a decade of Fox TV, we may no longer take it so much for granted!), but it was not an easy task, as indeed shown by the immediate misappropriation of Animal Farm and 1984 by many on the right.
Macdonald was not only foremost among those who looked closely at what Orwell was saying when he was alive, he was of course one of those who carried the flame for him when he was dead. The old saying de mortuis nil nisi bonum is ambivalent in the case of Orwell. There are far too many people whose views he would certainly have repudiated when he was alive, from revolutionary Trotskyists to reactionary conservatives, who have declared his work good beyond all measure, and expropriated it to their own causes.
Almost from the beginning, Orwell had been revolted by the deadness of party-line prose, and developed his distinctive idiom. Possibly, one of the reasons why he has been so susceptible to adoption by so many distinctive political strands may be his studied avoidance of partisan tropes and clichés that would otherwise have labeled his writing as leaning to particular sects or parties.
In the sometimes content-light world of left wing polemics it is the way things are said as much as what is said the identifies the protagonists. In contrast, Macdonald, in the end, had moved from being a polemical opponent, to one of the best expositors of their shared message against tyrannies of whatever hue Macdonald may have worried less about the exactness of his content, but he was equally interested in lively prose, and so it was perhaps not surprising that Macdonald discussed with Sonia Orwell the writing of his biography. Clearly, by then his political temperament, and his Anglophilic appreciation for the context of Orwell’s life and work would have made him an interesting biographer. Certainly, Trotsky, Orwell and Socialism, his 1956 New Yorker essay lays out more clearly than some more recent exegesis the reality Orwell’s relationship to the Left.
However, one cannot help but suspect that the very idiosyncrasy and sense of self-worth that Macdonald customarily displayed would have produced a work that was more illuminating about its author than its subject. The dialectic between the two would indeed give us some insights about both.
1 comment
1 Richard Kostelanetz { 08.30.12 at 3:11 am }
thanks, Ian, for the informative, sensitive pieces, suggesting someone should do a book wholly of their correspondence. Different books of mine were dedicated to the memory of both men. RK

Sunday, March 15, 2009

The Good(ish) War

Second Thoughts About the Good War _ Common Review Winter 2009

By Ian Williams

Books discussed in this essay:

Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War: How Britain Lost its Empire and the West Lost the World
By Patrick Buchanan
Crown, 544 pages, $29.95

Human Smoke: The Beginnings of World War II, the End of Civilization,
By Nicholson Baker
Simon & Schuster, 576 pages, $30

Chamberlain and the Lost Peace
By John Charmley
Ivan R. Dee, 257 pages, $27.95 (clothbound 1989)

Churchill: the End of Glory: A Political Biography
By John Charmley
Harcourt, 742 pages, $34.95 (clothbound 1993)

1940: Myth and Reality
By Clive Ponting
Ivan R. Dee, 273 pages, $24.95 (clothbound 1991)

Armageddon: The Reality Behind the Distortions: Myths, Lies, Illusions of World War II
By Clive Ponting
Random House, 376 pages, $27.50 (clothbound 1995)




Nicholson Baker and Patrick Buchanan are neither kindred spirits nor ideological soulmates. They occupy opposite ends of the political spectrum, the former a gifted writer of fiction who has given himself in recent years to the cause of preserving newspaper archives, the latter a bruising culture warrior who began his career as a speechwriter for Richard Nixon. Although the duo of Baker & Buchanan alliterates in promising ways, one cannot really imagine them dancing very well together.

It is a surprise, then, and an opportunity for reflection, to find both provoking outrage for debunking the accepted notion of World War Two as the ultimate in just wars. In contrast to the general acceptance among scholars and historians that the First World War was a costly, disastrous mistake, our popular vision of World War Two is one of a crusade so virtuous as to be beyond criticism—a struggle, yes, between good and evil. It is Studs Terkel’s “Good War” waged by Tom Brokaw’s “Greatest Generation.” In this narrative, Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt stand side by side for democracy against the original Axis of Evil, dictators Hitler, Mussolini, and the Emperor Hirohito, whose designs of world domination had to be stopped, by whatever means necessary.
[section break]
Drawing attention to Churchill’s manifold imperfections may seem iconoclastic in the United States, where many American conservatives have indeed made him an icon and even liberals hold residual warm feelings for FDR’s transatlantic partner. However, in Britain, these sorts of attacks on that cigar-smoking brandy-toper merely represent the resurgence of what is practically a folk tradition. After all, they voted him out of office in 1945, in a landslide defeat, right on the heels of his greatest triumph.
[section break]
I’ve had personal experience of these mixed feelings. During the 1960s, my Christmas vacation job was in the head post office in the Port of Liverpool. Most of my fulltime colleagues were war veterans, who found the uniform and hierarchy of the postal service comforting. Early one chilly morning, I sat in a red General Post Office van, waiting with the rest of the gang to go down to the docks, waiting for one tardy worker.
The driver poked his head in and lamented that Churchill would have sorted out the latecomer. The former sergeant by the door asked, deadpan, “Churchill? Wasn’t he the one who said that Tobruk wouldn’t fall?” His companion took up the theme. “No—it was Singapore, wasn’t it?” A third chipped in, “No, wasn’t he the guy who got all the Aussies killed at Gallipoli?” Yet another demurred, “No, he was the one who sent the army against the miners in Tonypandy.”
And so it went around the van, giving me graphic evidence of why Churchill’s feet of clay had marched him to electoral defeat as the country celebrated military victory.
Don’t get me wrong—these men were proud of victory in World War Two. Given a choice between Neville Chamberlain and Churchill they had no doubts – but then given a choice in the 1945 election between Clement Attlee, the Labour Party leader, and Churchill, they were equally certain, despite Churchill’s scurrilous attempt to liken his wartime coalition partners to the Gestapo.
On both sides of the Atlantic, our historical vision has an inherent tendency towards a Manichean, and in the English-speaking world, a Panglossian frame. As the victors, we tend to accept uncritically that everything was for the best. The war made the United States the world’s unquestionably strongest power, while for the British there was the vicarious comfort of the alleged special relationship, along with the consolation that they had given their all for a good cause.
However, the simple fact that the American president and the British prime minister stood side by side with Josef Stalin suggests the need for generous doses of doublethink to maintain the myth uncritically. Any serious study reveals the gray complexities of the titanic struggle, which Clive Ponting, the British whistle-blowing civil servant turned author, calls “Armageddon.” As Humpty Dumpty put it, the question was, “Which is to be Master – that’s all.” And the war certainly resolved that question for the Axis powers. Most of us would assume that for all their manifest faults, we are better off that way. Baker and Buchanan demur.
[section break]
Even if we disagree with their conclusions, They both raise general ethical and particular historical questions that deserve to be thrashed out. How far can nations go to avert a threatened evil? Do measures such as embargos and bombing that harm civilians fatally compromise a “just war?” How far can one compromise with evil to secure peace? In the particular historical application, was an alliance with Stalin justified—and was he really the lesser evil? Should the United States have joined in the war? Could Britain have made peace with Hitler, and would doing so have preserved the British Empire? And the question certainly not posed by Patrick Buchanan: would that preservation have been a good thing for Britain, the Empire or the world?
Baker and Buchanan pose the questions starkly in black and white binary terms, but any rational answers are not so clear, certainly not as clear as those they imply or state. In real politics, “fuzzy logic” applies as circumstances shift. Lord Halifax, former foreign secretary and wartime ambassador to the US, epitomized the empirical strain in British foreign policy that is now reviled as appeasement. He commented, “The world is a strangely mixed grill of good and evil,” and “for good or ill we have to do our best to live in it and not withdraw into the desert because of the evil, like the ancient anchorites.” (Charmley, Chamberlain 66)
Such a policy emanates naturally from an offshore island, short of resources and weakened by two colossal conflicts in a few decades in the nearby continent. Buchanan retrospectively advocates just such a pragmatic approach for Britain. He thinks that Churchill’s belligerently anti-German approach stopped a desirable deal between Germany and Britain, which would have left the latter its Empire in return for Berlin ruling Europe. However, the pragmatic real-politik that Buchanan posits for Britain is a thin cover for his crusading zeal. Such a deal would have enabled the “Christian” powers as he refers to them to defeat or contain the real enemy – Stalin. Buchanan follows and extends the furrows ploughed by John Charmley and other revisionist historians to make Churchill almost single-handedly responsible for the conflict and the consequent dissolution of the British Empire and triumph of the Soviets in Eastern Europe.
From behind the security of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as buffers, one can see why America Firsters and their modern descendants like Buchanan, or indeed with a bar sinister for illegitimate descent, Baker, can take such highly Manichaean views. These two books in conjunction revive memories of a distinctive American lineage: of the mass movements that united Nazi sympathizers, Communist Party supporters, and pacifists in trying to keep the United States out of the war.
From opposite political poles, Baker and Buchanan converge in regarding World War Two as an unnecessary and avoidable conflict.
As the saying appropriately has it, the devil is in the details, which during World War Two sadly did include Allied mass bombings of civilians, violations of neutrality, active or tacit support for ethnic cleansing, blockades that starved civilians, betrayal of allies, and naked displays of national self-interest—all of which both belabor in detail. They provoke thought, even as they disturb.
Baker eschews pragmatism. War itself is evil, the Second World War no less than others, and his villains are both Churchill and Roosevelt, who with Machiavellian cunning engineered an un-necessary war, and fought it with amoral brutality. Human Smoke is much more readable than Buchanan’s, although both would have benefited from more thorough fact-checking. Leaving aside for a moment his implicit endorsement of conspiracy theories such as Roosevelt setting Pearl Harbor as a trap for the Japanese, someone should surely have noticed in aBaker’s book, (p. 457) that for the SS Struma to be sunk in the “Baltic” sea after being chsed from Istanbul would have entailed a highly unlikely trip up the Volga. Baker could also usefully have mentioned that Germany that declared war on the USA after Pearl Harbor, not vice versa. It was far from sure that the reluctant Congress, with a preponderance of Buchanan and Baker’s political ancestors, would have responded to the Japanese attack with a declaration of war on Germany.
Editing out tendentious repetition could have shortened Buchanan’s work into a more readable form. And like Baker, he needed an editor paying more attention to the facts. In Buchanan’s old school Cold War perspective, the Soviets can do no right—ever. For example, he charges that in the Warsaw Rising of 1944, the Polish Home Army rose on Soviet signals, which is simply not true. While the Soviets certainly did not try too hard to support the rising that the London-based Polish government-in-exile, the Home Army had risen on signals from London to forestall the Red Army’s “liberation” of the city. The rising was a brave but essentially cynical risk of the city and its population to achieve that end.
Similarly, Buchanan gives Hitler a free pass for the bombing of Guernica, depicted so memorably by Picasso, claiming that it was to support military operations and thus no precedent or excuse for the subsequent Allied bombings of cities, through which, Buchanan asserts, Churchill would play a “lead role in Western man’s reversion to barbarism.” (Buchanan 399) More accurately, and less hampered by affection for Spain’s Fascist dictator Francisco Franco, Baker cites Hermann Goering on Guernica. The German Luftwaffe commander called that action “a pity,” but also insisted, “we had nowhere else to try our machines.” (Baker 69) Of course, Buchanan, given his soft spot for Franco (elsewhere he has described him as a “soldier-patriot” (syndicated column 9/17/89 and “Catholic savior” (Right from the Beginning) could live with that. Most others would not.
Buchanan has no reticence about using tendentious commentary or drawing such controversial conclusions in his narrative. In some ways, this is refreshing, since it gives the many skeptical readers something to react against. Baker’s is almost insidiously sneering in its effect, since he is insinuating rather than stating a case. He presents carefully selected facts and invites us to draw our, or rather his, conclusions from them. It is reminiscent of the wilder fringes of the web that marshal factoids and quotes torn out of context and without reference or analysis to support various causes.
Still, despite their agendas, both successfully challenge our preconceptions. Buchanan points out that the peace terms after World War One deprived millions of Germans (not to mention others) of their right to self-determination. Even though the post-Versailles states of Czechoslovakia and Poland have been retrospectively sanctified by Nazi aggression, there was indeed no ethical argument against voluntary Anschluss, unification, with the ethnic Germans in Austria, Sudetenland, East Prussia, the Polish Corridor and so on. Even the socialists in the Saarland voted to reunite with Germany. They were not coerced into it. Indeed, one of the points that John Charmley convincingly makes is that British leaders’ appreciation of how insupportable and unsustainable the Versailles boundaries were in the wake of the Great War disarmed their opposition to Hitler’s expansionism.
It is equally true that the Western allies’ willingness to violate the neutrality of Belgium, of Norway, Denmark, and Portugal under the exigencies of war was precisely the charge made against defeated Nazis at Nuremburg. The Soviets’ record was even worse, with their trampling on Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Rumania and other states.
One of the problems for both Baker and Buchanan is that it takes delicate treatment to blacken the reputations of accepted heroes without implicitly, or even explicitly, whitewashing their antagonists. Buchanan does not typically do delicacy, and Baker, whose novels often showcase his gift for nuance, chooses in this book to abandon subtlety altogether with his demonization of Churchill. Buchanan has the clearer ideological agenda. While most British see the postwar welfare state and national health service as worthy consolations for the travails of war, Buchanan laments that because of Churchill’s war, Britain “faced socialism at home.” (415)
[section break]
Buchanan’s Churchill, Hitler and the Unnecessary War lays out its wares in its title. His frequent caveats about the evil of Hitler look like ritual invocations to avert hostile reaction to the drift of his argument—which is that the Nazi leader was a lesser evil.
Buchanan persistently sees the silver linings in Hitler’s stormtrooper clouds. He describes Hitler’s apprehensions over Austrian Nazi provocations (318) and the march into the Rhineland and deduces that he did not want war with the West. (310) He repeats his disclaimer, ”For what happened to the Jews of Europe, Hitler and his collaborators . . .bear full responsibility” (310)] he says, for the record, but then ruins his disavowal by trying to imply blame elsewhere. He cavils, “But was the Holocaust inevitable? Could it have been averted?” (ibid) Well, yes, by an earlier defeat of the Nazis, not by making peace and giving them the free hand in the East.
He argues that the belligerence of Churchill drove Hitler to war, leading in turn to a baneful result: the downfall of the British Empire and the rise of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. It is true, as Buchanan contends, that in 1939 Stalin’s regime had far more blood on its hands than Hitler’s much more visible but, at the time, less sanguinary crimes. One can almost sympathize with Buchanan’s puzzlement at the difference in treatment. Partly of course, it is retrospective absolution. Once Stalin had become an ally, in fact the main driver of the war effort, the West owed some considerable gratitude, even if the convenient amnesia about his enthusiastic honoring of the 1939 pact with Hitler may have gone too far.
Buchanan is on surer ground when he castigates Churchill for taking Stalin at his word, at least about elections and freedoms for the nations he signed over to the Soviet sphere. However, Stalin did deliver on a number of war promises, maybe most notably in Greece where Churchill and the British showed equal insouciance about local wishes. It is worth stressing that Roosevelt was even more partial to Stalin, in effect ganging up with him against his British ally. Of course, Churchill was as dedicated as Buchanan to the lost cause of preserving the British Empire—to which the Soviet Union posed little or no direct threat at this stage—but which Roosevelt and the United States, as Clive Ponting and Buchanan both detail, were effectively dismantling.
Although Stalin’s record was certainly quantitatively worse and more murderous than Hitler’s by 1939 and indeed up to 1941, the Nazis certainly made up for lost time afterwards. In contrast, Buchanan implies that Hitler was the lesser evil, in part because Communism was more exportable than Nazism. He points out the limitations of the appeal of Aryanism and its contrast with the more universal aspirations of the Communists.
Looking at the authoritarian regimes that emulated the Nazis, this is a highly arguable point. (p 345) Italy, Spain, Rumania, Japan, Bulgaria were quite acceptable as allies despite their manifest lack of Aryan bloodlines. However, the exportability of communism did depend on its romantic ideal of equality, so its supporters could pass off the “excesses” as aberrations, while Hitler’s ideology of race and blood was itself explicitly based on excess.
Arch-appeaser Neville Chamberlain ruined his reputation with his sound bites of “peace with honor” and “peace in our time”—which Charmley points out he immediately regretted—but he does indeed deserve a rehabilitation that Buchanan oddly fails to offer. According to Charmley, in cabinet discussions he talked of threatening Hitler with a two-front war, (p170 Charmley) “not in order to save a particular victim but to pull down the bully,” which is surely the point, despite Buchanan’s invective against guaranteeing Poland against German attack. The Polish regime was anti-Semitic, undemocratic and intransigent but the guarantee represented a line in the sand for international peace and order—which Hitler crossed.
Having regretted Chamberlain’s guarantee to Poland and the ensuing declaration of war, Buchan then attacks Churchill for not suing for peace in 1940. Strong partisan prejudice often marshals contradictory arguments. In this vein, Buchanan suggests that Hitler only invaded Russia to force Britain to a peace treaty, but then elsewhere he suggests that a peace treaty with Britain would have let Hitler attack Stalin and sort out the Bolsheviks.
Clearly, the Nazi leader was eventually going to attack the Soviet Union regardless of the non-aggression pact, even though Stalin honoured it to the letter, to the extent that Communists in the USA agreed with Buchanan about the inhumanity of the British blockade starving German workers. Consequently, only a very foolish British government would trust guarantees from either Berlin or Moscow. Equally, though it may be true that Hitler did not want war with Britain, the missing adverb is surely “then.” In fact, as his multiple aggressions suggested, Hitler took whatever opportunities were offered for expansion.
He insists that Germany posed no immediate threat to the United States and elaborates on the Germany’s lack of long range bombers, without reckoning on Werner Von Braun and his work, which was intended to get missiles to his future home, nor the work of the German nuclear researchers. He asserts that (334) Stalin used the two years of the Pact “to build the tanks, planes and guns and conscript the troops that stopped Hitler at Leningrad.” Well, up to a point. Those would be the planes destroyed on the ground and the tanks, guns and troops that the Wermacht captured with such ease in the first few weeks of war because Stalin made the same mistake as Buchanan occasionally does—taking Hitler’s expedient promises seriously.
The feasibility of peace between Britain and Nazi Germany goes to the nub of the question. Buchanan insists that peace (one is tempted to add “with honor”) was achievable, and points to the armistice that allowed Vichy to keep the French Navy. However, since the alternative to a French Navy confined to port may have been one that sailed off to join the Royal Navy, this was as much politic as politeness on the Führer’s part. Perhaps a better reference would have been to the Vichy’s reactionary domestic policies in emulation of the Nazis.
One suspects that a less vindictive Hitler, prepared to return prisoners and lift the occupation, could have turned France in the same way that the Allies turned Italy in 1943. In fact, Buchanan’s implicit assumption is that Hitler was a rational actor and a man of his word. In fact, he already had a consistently murderous record, from the night of the Long Knives, through Kristallnacht and onto his culling of the inmates of mental hospitals. In contrast with Stalin, who was generally content to keep his butchery domestic, Hitler showed every sign of wanting to expand his terror. More significantly, after Munich, he broke every promise he made to the British.

Buchanan asserts that Hitler stopped the Panzers (326) and in effect let the British escape from Dunkirk, which fails to explain why the Luftwaffe attacked the evacuating ships furiously. In fact, Ponting points out that the British let the French cover their retreat, and that it was the French Army that stopped the Wermacht long enough for the British to evacuate, leaving most of their French allies and defenders behind.
Buchanan’s nostalgia for the British Empire as a bulwark of Christendom, even at the cost of handing over Eastern Europe to Hitler, also challenges logic. His assumption that Germans in the Sudetenland and the Polish Corridor deserved self-determination but that the Indians, Burmese, and Africans did not betrays a bedrock racist assumption. This is scarcely mitigated by his description of Churchill’s racist diatribes against Indians (356) which provided cogent reasons why the Empire was as undesirable as it was unsustainable.
Quite apart from any ethical moral aspects, the challenge of defending a far-flung empire, many of whose subjects were restless and did little to contribute to the wealth or defence of the mother country, stretched the already parlous British finances. Indeed, Britain might well have been better off abandoning its imperial pretensions sooner. Certainly if India had been given the Dominion status that Churchill resisted so tenaciously, it may have become like Canada or Australia in sentimental attachment, but the only way to keep it as a colony would have been to take Hitler’s advice, and progressively shoot the leaders of the Congress Party.
However, as Buchanan explains, the greatest enemy of the Empire was in fact the USA. He complains that, “When Britain was in her darkest hour, FDR shook her down for every dime,” (p 408) and goes on to quote one of Churchill’s memorable lines: “we are not only to be skinned but flayed to the bone.” [ibid) He also quotes Grenfell on the “extraordinary paradox that Britain’s principal enemy was anxious for the British Empire to remain in being, while her principal ally, the United States, was determined to destroy it.” (409) For the record, Buchanan’s political antecedents, the America-Firsters, certainly did not object to the process!
However, quite apart from exercising his retrospective adhesion to the America-Firsters, his staunch anti-communism, and his equally staunch Catholicism, Buchanan has written a tract for our times, a polemic against the “Churchillian” aspects of neo-conservativism. He concludes that Bush, who, damningly, possesses “a bust of Churchill in the Oval Office,” (423) has led the United States to the same position as Britain was: “A superpower past her prime, with enemies rising everywhere.” He adds that, “There is hardly a blunder of the British Empire that we have not replicated . . . America is as overextended as the British Empire in 1939.” (423) He has a point, but many people have as little enthusiasm for an American empire as they did for its British predecessor.
[section break]
Baker’s “Human Smoke” takes a pacifist tilt at the same targets, not least in sharing Buchanan’s touching faith in the Führer’s diplomatic integrity. Baker cites Charles Lindbergh’s disquiet with the pacifists—alongside whom he campaigned against war with Germany. Perhaps more of the Pacifists should have reciprocated that discomfort.
Baker’s book reads like a Dos Passos novel with its cut and paste technique. It eschews commentary—but also elides some relevant facts, Baker directs the narrative as surely as any overt editorializing would. Sometimes the sound of silence is deafeningly loud. His omission of Hitler’[s declaration of war on the United States, not vice versa, relays his political bias. His choice of material suggests that he blames Roosevelt equally with Churchill for the war, without showing too much concern for the fate of empires, Soviet or British, or indeed the fate of Europe if Hitler had had a free hand.

Baker implicitly states that Pearl Harbor was contrived by FDR to get America into the war, (p445) which almost makes one anticipate his next work on how the World Trade Center was not really hit by planes. In his afterword, he asks, “Was it a ‘good war?’ Did waging it help anyone who needed help? Those were the basic questions that I hoped to answer.” (473) However, his question, like those Buchanan asks, is rhetorical, as he immediately answers, (p. 315) “Had Britain not given the war guarantee, and not declared war over Poland, Western Europe might have avoided war altogether. And was the war worth it?”
His book is dedicated to “the memory of Clarence Pickett and other American and British pacifists . . . They tried to save Jewish refugees, feed Europe, reconcile the United States and Japan and stop the war happening. They failed, but they were right.” (474) In essence, Baker makes a moral equivalence between aggressive and vicious warmongers and those who choose to meet that kind of aggression with force. George Orwell, who managed to be mercilessly critical of Allied conduct while supporting the war, commented appositely, that, “Pacifist propaganda usually boils down to saying that one side is as bad as the other, but if one looks closely at the writings of younger intellectual pacifists, one finds that they do not by any means express impartial disapproval, but are directed almost entirely against Britain and the United States.” (Notes on Nationalism)
In his obituary essay on Gandhi, who is frequently cited by Baker, Orwell praised the Indian pacifist because he “did not take the sterile and dishonest line of pretending that in every war both sides are exactly the same and it makes no difference who wins.”
(Reflections on Gandhi)
[section break]
Fifteen years ago, the ultra-Tory minister Alan Clarke caused a major flurry when, in reviewing Charmley’s work, he suggested that an Anglo-German alliance in 1940 would have made the world a better place. (Buchanan 316) It is along these lines of thinking that Buchanan uses Clark as a bludgeon against Churchill for refusing peace overtures: “the war went on too long, and when Britain emerged the country was bust. Nothing remained of assets overseas. Without immense and punitive borrowings from the U.S., we would have starved. The old social order had gone forever. The empire was terminally damaged.” [Buchanan 316) Neither Buchanan nor Clark pause to consider that for many British voters, and many subjects of the empire, these latter two results were a consummation devoutly to be wished.
Still, Charmley’s efforts to rehabilitate Neville Chamberlain’s battered reputation are worth considering. In Charmley’s argument, Chamberlain indeed understood the unique threat posed by Hitler, but he also appreciated the financial and military weakness of the Allies. The facts Charmley summons help to rescue the reputation of Chamberlain from the outer darkness to which Labour and Churchillian Tories have jointly exiled it. In contrast to his historic reputation as an appeaser, Chamberlain was in fact emulating Theodore Roosevelt, talking softly while growing a big stick. Even while negotiating at Munich, he was allocating scarce resources to rearmament, bringing online the Spitfires and Hurricanes that won the Battle of Britain. Astonishingly, from 1935 to 1939, British defense spending rose by forty percent annually, even while the country was paying off the highest per capita debt in the world—incurred by the struggle of World War One. Such military expenditure was unsustainable, which is why if there were to be war, it had to be quick. Far from being unprepared and naïve, the British authorities had made a shrewd and accurate assessment of the probability of war in 1939.
They had already concluded that they did not have the military resources to fight in both the Pacific and in Europe. A more besetting problem facing London was the complete absence of any guarantees from the United States. Britain’s lean finances also shaped the methods against which Baker and Buchanan protest so much. In World War One, the blockade, no matter how brutally, had worked and made effective use of Britain’s biggest military asset, the Royal Navy. Now, at the outset of World War Two, there was no way that Britain could in any reasonable time develop the size of army it had eventually deployed in World War One, and that led to the decision to rely on airpower—which would eventually culminate in the mass civilian bombings that Baker and Ponting especially revile.
[section break]
Books that propose a world better off without World War Two can only lead into the hypothetical realm of “What if?” What we do have is very strong evidence about the direction and form of an unopposed Hitler regime. Chamberlain’s exasperation after Munich was solidly based on Hitler’s breach of promise, both about the integrity of the rump Czechoslovakia, and more broadly, his false disclaiming of future territorial claims in Europe. As Ponting quotes Hitler declaring at the very start of his rampage, “Once I conquered a country, should I ever restore its freedom? What for? Whoever spent his blood has the right to rule.” (P 249) Equally, his counterproductive savagery and exploitation of his Polish and Soviet conquests constitute a real-time demonstration of the shape of his New World Order. Despite his late start, he soon overtook Stalin in horror and terror, to the extent that even the Poles could regard the Red Army’s arrival as comparative liberation.
Once it was clear that there was no speedy end in sight, the British could indeed have done what Buchanan implies they should have done. An agreement with Hitler would certainly have cost Churchill his job, and it would have guaranteed the “Empire” for a short time. However, defeated or stalemated empires are fragile things.
Buchanan asks, was the sacrifice “done willingly as an act of martyrdom? Or was it rather the result of British blundering on a colossal scale.” (313) There was indeed blundering, but Ponting answers Buchanan’s question with clarity, pointing out that “1940 marked the final and decisive shift of power in the world from Britain to the US.” (Ponting 1940 215) It was neither martyrdom nor blundering, but rather a voluntary abdication on Britain’s part. On 22 August 1940, after Dunkirk and the French defeat, the British cabinet met to consider the numbers, which showed that Britain did not have its own resources to continue the struggle for much longer. (Ponting 1940 p 10) The Cabinet decided to fight on, hoping Micawber-like that something would turn up, even if it meant, in Churchill’s words, “giving the United States, if necessary, a lien on any and every part of British industry.”
Roosevelt took up the offer. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau unilaterally announced a fire sale of every British asset, individual or public in the United States, and indeed in Canada and Latin America as well. While Congress was passing the Lend Lease bill, Great Britain had only £3 million left in its reserves and had to borrow from the Belgian and Czech governments in exile. (Ponting 1940 p 213)
It was not as Quixotic a gesture as Buchanan puts it, nor as blindly bellicose as Baker would have it. Britain was not in a financial position to use peace as breathing space to rearm. At peace it would not have qualified for the tightly restricted American loans and support it secured when it was in Washington’s interest to keep London fighting.
Orwell In his essay “The Lion and the Unicorn” Hitler’s offer could only be made “treacherously, with a view to conquering England indirectly or renewing the attack at some more favourable moment.” Indeed Clive Ponting observes that World War One leader Lloyd George expected that without backing from the United States, Great Britain would have to sue for a compromise peace – with himself playing the role of Petain, the revered war leader who could cut the deal.
In the end, Churchill and Roosevelt were every bit as Machiavellian and steeped in Realpolitik as Baker and Buchanan show them to be. Nevertheless, remembering what Halifax said, the world is a better place because they were not anchorites, and knew how to operate in an evil world. Pace Joan of Arc, saints do not usually win wars. We should be glad that for all their moral failings, Churchill and Roosevelt, each of whom could have given lessons to Machiavelli, were in the appropriate places at the right times.
In large part, Western Europe has for over sixty years enjoyed peace and prosperity, along with the highest standards of human and civil rights in the history of the world, at least in part because the British cabinet made that decision on August 22 1940. Was it worth it? Yes, absolutely.

Friday, February 23, 2007

Demon du jour

Here is the full text of the Comment is Free piece Demon du jour
The comments, for which you have to check the Guardian site, are fun, mostly taking the blindly binary approach that I was questioning. In this mirror universe, calling someone a mass murderer is apparently revisionist whitewashing if you do not admit they kicked the dog and robbed kid's piggy banks as well.

Are Ahmadinejad, Cheney, Mao and Chavez really as evil as everyone says?

Ian Williams


February 21, 2007 8:30 PM | Printable version

The allegation that George W Bush has read and enjoyed the 814 page Mao: The Unknown Story, is on the face of, amazing. I have just finished reading it - and, for a start, it does not have many pictures. But on another level - once you have overcome a natural scepticism about his reading prowess - you can see why both the subject and treatment of the massive biography would appeal to the president, even if he only received an executive summary.

On the one hand, Bush has taken Mao's aphorism that political power comes from the barrel of a gun to levels way beyond the puny weaponry of Mao's army, not to mention emulated Mao's idiosyncratic uses of the word "democracy".

And on the other hand, the president has previously said that he does not "do nuance", and neither does this book - which is so relentlessly negative that it almost provokes sympathy for a man who was, as the authors exhaustively document, responsible for the deaths of millions. Likewise, demonization is the weapon of choice in this administration. They practiced it on Saddam Hussein, on Fidel Castro, and on Yasser Arafat, and are currently honing it for use on Hugo Chavez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Most Americans probably assume that these people kick their dogs, abuse their children and are totally faithless to their friends and spouses. But it doesn't work that way. Dick Cheney can be a sinister force for evil - and still love his lesbian daughter.

Even the worst rulers are complex. Think of a leader who died, faithful to one woman for many years, who was a vegetarian, a pet-lover, a non-smoking teetotaler and a sincere believer in all the causes he had espoused for thirty years. One worries whether to name him, in case Adolf Hitler is mistaken for some evangelical saint.

In fact, Milton had a more complex picture of Satan than much of the contemporary western media does of its enemies. Once people are tainted with evil, it is assumed that, like some figure from Marlowe or Webster, everything they do is evil.

I should warn that if ever I grow up, the title of my memoirs will be "I was a Teenage Maoist". I was in China during the Cultural Revolution, had a drinking competition with Chou En Lai and had the temerity to argue about English Literature with Chiang China, aka Mme Mao. The period was a useful prophylactic against the temptations of rigid political lines in later life.

Yet the new Mao book is over the top. Certainly Mao had enough hagiographies written about him in his time. But demonographies are equally uninstructive and this one fails to explain how he mesmerized a nation. The authors show him as having a monstrous ego - but do not mention, let alone explain, why he refused to allow any places to be named after him. When I was there, they had just built the Beijing metro, and party officials chuckled at their own temerity to say that the station by the Forbidden City was called "Chairman station". The Mao book presents no such complexity.

According to the book, naked self-interest motivated every decision Mao made, and the Chinese economy was a shambles when he died. But that does not explain the foundations from which the Chinese economic miracle sprang. As with Stalin's terror, there were many beneficiaries, and millions who believed along with Mao that they were building a better world. The book, and demonography in general, finds it easier to load all the sins and responsibilities on the designated demon - which abandons the responsibility to think about motivations and backgrounds, let alone the context that made such terror possible.

While it may work for whipping up war fever, this form of writing actually disarms us against real totalitarianism - against what Hannah Arendt called the banality of evil. A binary, black and white, cowboys-and-Indians depiction of political figures does not equip us to deal with the real world.

In fact, the most dangerous tyrants are totally sincere. They are romantics, and think they're advancing humanity and civilization. On account of their monstrous egos, they tend to see themselves as the means of such advance. (The old aphorism about the road to hell applies here.) From the Crusades to the Inquisition, from the Nazis to the Bolsheviks, it's people with "good" and even selfless intentions whose efforts to make a better world have created hell on it.

They know best, regardless of the fickle and fragile human material they have had to work with. But far from being the work of one evil tyrant, the successful demons have always known how to appeal to masses of people. It takes more than one man, or woman, to conduct a purge, a holocaust or a Great Leap Forward - or even a jihad or crusade.

To take a recent example, by loading all the evil on Osama Bin Laden as an individual, we do not have to think about his political origins, the role played by Washington in nurturing him and his ilk as proxy warriors in Afghanistan, let alone the genuine grievances that he has been able to play upon in the Arab and Muslim World.

Such one dimensional depictions are also easy to drop on demand. Just as Saddam Hussein changed overnight from the West's man in the Middle East - when he was rocketing Tehran - to the devil incarnate after Kuwait, you will have noted an almost complete silence about what's-his-name-with-the-turban, who inconveniently hid in Afghanistan rather than Iraq or Iran when wars were wanted in Washington.

Down with demonization! We should be trying to understand these people - not in the hand-wringing way of the stereotypical liberal social worker - but to understand what motivates them so that we can dissipate the romantic illusions of those who always know what is best for others, whether it is Hugo Chavez - or the Project for a New American Century.